The primate prefrontal cortex represents both past and future goals. To investigate its role in representing the goals of other agents, we designed a nonmatch-to-goal task that involved a human-monkey (H-M) interaction. During each trial, 2 of 4 potential goal objects were presented randomly to the left or right part of a display screen, and the monkey's (or human's) task was to choose the one that did not match the object goal previously chosen. Human and monkey trials were intermixed, and each agent, when acting as observer, was required to monitor the other actor's choice to switch the object goal choice in case it became the actor on the subsequent trial. We found neurons encoding the actor, either the monkey itself or the human, neurons encoding the agent future goal position and neurons encoding the agent previous goal position. In the category of neurons encoding the human future goal, we differentiated between those encoding the future goal of both agents and those encoding only the human agent future goal. While the first one might represent a covert mental simulation in the human trials, the other one could represent a prediction signal of the other's agent choice.
Introduction
The social life of primates requires multiple skills. To succeed in a social group, it is vital to recognize other individuals, understand and predict their behavior, remember the previous interaction with them to act appropriately in future interactions, and monitor other individuals' behavior to understand third-party relationships. The impact of social skills on fitness has led to the hypothesis that the evolution of granular prefrontal cortex in primates was shaped by social (Barton 1996) in addition to foraging demands .
Several studies have recently examined the ability of monkeys to coordinate (Fujii et al. 2007; Yoshida et al. 2011) or cooperate (Mendres and de Waal 2000) with each other. It emerges from these studies that monkeys are able to monitor other agents' choices and their outcome and to use this knowledge to guide their own decisions (Chang et al. 2011; Falcone, Brunamonti, Ferraina et al. 2012; Bevacqua et al. 2013; Falcone et al. 2013) .
Numerous studies have investigated the role of mirror neurons in parieto-frontal circuits in monkeys (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996; Caggiano et al. 2009; Bonini et al. 2010; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010) and humans (Iacoboni et al. 2005; Mukamel et al. 2010) . Mirror neurons are activated both by action execution and by its observation. Because of this property, they are thought to provide the basis for bridging the gap between the physical self and others and for understanding the action and intentions of others. In addition to action understanding, Caggiano et al. (2009) have recently shown that they can be modulated by the distinction between peripersonal and extrapersonal space, adapting their activity to the possibility or not of interaction offered by an object located at different distances. However, mirror neurons have a significant limitation. They cannot distinguish between one's own choices and those of other agents. This aspect of representing one's self and others has only recently begun to be addressed, mainly through experiments that required the monkeys to take into account other monkeys' behavior and its outcome (Yoshida et al. 2011 (Yoshida et al. , 2012 Báez-Mendoza et al. 2013; Klein and Platt 2013; Haroush and Williams 2015) .
The objective of our study was to extend to the social context our understanding of the role of the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) in representing goals (Rainer et al. 1998; Saito et al. 2005; Genovesio et al. 2006 Genovesio et al. , 2012 Tanji and Hoshi 2008; Tsujimoto et al. 2008; Passingham and Wise 2012; Yamagata et al. 2012; Hoshi 2013) . Recent neuroimaging studies in humans indicated a role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in social cognition in other's error action prediction coding (Burke et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012) .
Past neurophysiological studies have investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of behavioral goals in the lPFC focusing on different aspects of goal generation. Genovesio et al. (2012) showed that domain-specific computations (duration vs. distance) lead to general domain goal signals, and similarly modality-and task-specific signals have been shown to evolve in task-and modality-independent general goal signals ). Furthermore, the encoding of goals in the lPFC is not limited to future goals but extends to the monitoring of past goals (Genovesio et al. 2006 Genovesio and Ferraina 2014; Genovesio, Tsujimoto et al. 2014) and to the transition from immediates to final goals (Saito et al. 2005) .
Along with the representation of previous goals (Barraclough et al. 2004; Genovesio et al. 2006; Genovesio, Tsujimoto et al. 2014 ; see Curtis and Lee 2010 for a review), future goals might involve an action performed by one's self or another agent in a social context. We designed a task that required the monkeys not to merely observe the actions of a human agent as done in previous studies that investigated the mirror neurons activity but to monitor the result of these actions to perform accurately. We focused on a specific cognitive function underlying social interaction: the monitoring of another agent's choices, changing from monkeymonkey (M-M) interactions used by other studies (Yoshida et al. 2011) to human-monkey (H-M) interactions (Falcone, Brunamonti, Ferraina et al. 2012) . Yoshida et al. (2011) studied the medial frontal cortex neurons in an interactive task in which 2 monkeys switched the role of actor and observer in a task that required associating flexibly one of 2 stimuli to the reward. The neuronal activity was modulated by the agent performing that action during movement, and a population of neurons was specifically modulated from the other's actions outcome (Yoshida et al. 2012) . In our interactive H-M task, monkeys not only observed the humans acting, as in the typical mirror-neuron studies, but they were required to interact and coordinate with them similarly to the study by Yoshida et al. (2011) . We found that lPFC had a role in representing the distinction between self and others, as well as another agent's past and future goals in addition to those of the observer monkey. While the neurons that have a shared representation of the future spatial goal in both monkey and humans trials could represent a mental simulation of the goal position or future action during the human trials, the neurons showing specifically a predictive activity for the human agent future goal could represent a predictive activity of the other agent behavior.
Material and Methods

Animals
Animal care, housing and experimental procedures conformed to the European (Directive 210/63/EU) and Italian (DD.LL. 116/92 and 26/14) laws on the use of nonhuman primates in scientific research. The housing conditions and the experimental procedures were in accordance with the European law on humane care and use of laboratory animals and complied with the recommendations of the Weatherall report (The use of nonhuman primates in research). Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in this study, Animal 1 (average weight 9.5 kg) and Animal 2 (average weight 7.5 kg).
Task
The monkeys sat in a primate chair, with the head fixed, facing a video touch screen (Microtouch, 19 inches, 800 × 600 pixel resolution) 20 cm away. Figure 1A shows the sequence of events in the nonmatch-to-goal task. The trial began when a white 7°circle, the central stimulus (CS), appeared at the center of the video screen. The monkey was not required to fixate the CS, because eye position was recorded but not placed under experimental control.
The monkeys had to touch the CS within 2 s; otherwise, the trial was aborted and a new trial started. After the monkeys touched the CS (with the left hand for Monkey 1 and the right hand for Monkey 2), a horizontal gray bar (18°× 10°) appeared on the screen (14°up from center). The monkeys were required to touch the CS for 0, 1.0, and 1.5 s after which 2 peripheral object goals of different shape (13°× 13°) appeared: 1 on the right and 1 on the left of the CS (24°left and right from center). We used the 1.5 s delay only in 5 sessions of Monkey 1 and never in Monkey 2. The object goals were white and of different shape (see at the top left of Fig. 1A ). The disappearance of the horizontal bar served as a go signal. The monkeys then made a reaching movement to one of the 2 potential goals, within a 3.0 s limit, and maintained the hand on the chosen goal for a holding-goal period of 0.8 or 1.2 s. The spatial position of the object goal is designed as goal position. Next, a visual feedback appeared around the chosen goal for a feedback period of 0.8 or 1.2 s, during which the monkeys continued to touch the goal. We used 4 types of feedbacks, which differed in shape or color. Two feedback stimuli (a 30°× 25°blue triangle and a 28°empty white circle) signaled an incorrect choice and 2 others (a 30°× 25°red triangle and an empty 24°× 24°white square) signaled a correct choice. Positive and negative feedback stimuli were paired in blocks of trials: the blue and red triangles, and the white circle and square (see on right at the top of Fig. 1A ). The 2 pairs of feedback signals alternated in blocks of 21 correct trials. In Monkey 1, we used only one type of feedback for the first 23 of 39 total sessions.
The task designed with a feedback period was intended to study the outcome-related activity in the monkey's trials in comparison to the human trials. We abandoned this objective due to the very low number of errors. Different visual stimuli for each type of feedback were thought for dissociating the outcome-related activity from the visual selectivity for the stimuli used as feedback.
After the feedback period, on the correctly performed trials, the monkeys received the water as reward. For Monkey 1, the reward was omitted in 1/12 of the correct trials, pseudorandomly selected to study the effect of reward omission for both humans and monkeys. In this study, we did not collect enough data for these particular trials, and they will be excluded from the analysis. After both correct and incorrect trials, the same 2 goals and the CS disappeared and followed an intertrial interval with duration between 1 and 1.5 s with a black video screen.
The chosen object goal on 1 trial became the previous object goal during the subsequent trial. On each trial, the previous object goal reappeared on the video screen together with a new goal, selected pseudorandomly from a list of the 3 remaining visual stimuli. The monkeys' task rule was to reject the previous object goal and choose the alternative goal, which we called the future object goal. If the monkeys chose the object goal as that chosen in the previous trial, they did not receive the reward and a correction trial followed. We always accepted the first trial of every session as correct, delivering always reward for any chosen goal. Correction trials consisted of the presentation of the same 2 object goals at the same 2 screen positions as in the just-completed and incorrectly performed trial. Every error in a correction trial was followed by another correction trial. Figure 1B shows a series of trials in which, in a subset of them, the monkey interacted with the human partner. Different human partners, all familiar to the monkeys, interacted with the monkeys in different sessions.
The human partner was sitting close to the animal, on the monkey's right side. The human partner could start his turn as actor only after the monkey completed a trial, never interrupting a monkey's trial. The human partner indicated its turn by moving the hand toward the center of the screen during the intertrial period, ready to touch the CS as soon it was turned on. When the human partner moved his arm toward the screen, monkeys were trained to let human partners performing the trial without interfering. When the human partner drew back his arm at the end of a trial, the monkeys again approached the CS and in this way began their next trial. The human partner could make a sequence from 1 to 4 of consecutive correct trials always corresponding to a reward delivery to the monkeys. Note that the human partner was always in the same position close to the monkey in the monkey trials.
The monkeys were trained to interact with the humans only after they had learned the nonmatch-to-goal task alone. Next, they learned in few sessions to interact with the human agent refraining from performing a trial when the human did. In the same sessions, both monkeys learned to monitor the human behavior similarly to the monkey's own behavior (Falcone, Brunamonti, Ferraina et al. 2012) .
During the social interaction, we distinguished the monkey trials in 2 categories: "not interactive and interactive" trials. The not interactive trials were all the trials performed by the monkey preceded by another trial performed by the monkey itself. The interactive trials were all the trials performed by the monkey preceded by a trial performed by the human partner ( Fig. 1B) . In 
Surgical Techniques
During the training, a head holding device was implanted under aseptic surgical conditions. The animals were sedated with ketamine (10 mg/kg, i.m.) and anesthetized with isofluoran (Abbott Laboratories) through a constant flux of isofluoran/O 2 mixture (1-3%, to effect). Antibiotics and analgesics were administered postoperatively. Before the recording started, again under general anesthesia, a recording cylinder (18 mm in diameter) was implanted stereotaxically in the right frontal lobe for Monkey 1 and in the left lobe for Monkey 2. Recording sites were localized by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in Monkey 2 and relative to the arcuate and principal sulcus in Monkey 1 after opening the dura matter for a different experimental protocol involving the same animal. The penetrations composite of both monkeys are plotted on an illustrative brain figure (Fig. 1C ).
Data Collection
A noncommercial software package, CORTEX (dally.nimh.nih. gov), was used to control stimuli presentation and reward delivery, to record touches on the screen and categorize each trial depending on who performed it: the monkey or the human agent.
We monitored the eye position through the ViewPoint Eye Tracker system (Arrington Research, Scottsdale, USA). Neural activity of single units was recorded extracellularly with a 5-channel multielectrode system (Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany). Electrodes were quartz-insulated platinum-tungsten fibers (80-μm diameter, 0.8-to 2.5-MΩ impedance) and were inserted transdurally, one at a time, with microdrives (Thomas Recording). Electrical signals were amplified and filtered, and single units were isolated online with TDT (Tucker-Davis Technologies, TDT, Alachua, USA) system. The quality of waveforms selected online was always controlled using the offline sorter (OpenSorter of TDT). The same system was used to record the eye movements. The analyses were performed by using the MATOFF software (Genovesio and Mitz 2007) .
Neurophysiological Analysis
All the analyses were performed only on current correct trials preceded by previous correct trials. We analyzed the neural activity in 5 periods of the task of all the neurons recorded with no preselection based on task relationship assessment. Since the human and monkey trials were intermixed, we did not need to normalize the activity. The CS period extended from 80 to 1000 ms. The same time window was applied to the delay period, starting from the appearance of the 2 goals, when the delay was >0 ms. The reaction and movement (RM) period extended from the go-signal to the touch of the goal. The holding-goal period included the first 800 ms after the goal was touched. The feedback period extended from 80 to 800 ms after the feedback stimulus had been turned on. We performed several 2-way ANOVA analyses, one in each task period. The first 2-way ANOVA analysis used current agent and goal position as factors. In this analysis, trials were sorted by the current goal position and by the agent performing the current trial. Similarly in the second 2-way ANOVA analysis, the factors were object goal and agent.
In the third 2-way ANOVA analysis, the factors were the previous agent and previous goal position. In this third analysis, we included the current trials performed either by the human agent or by the monkey. We used post hoc testing for analyzing the goal position selectivity for each agent. For all statistical analyses, α level was set to 0.05.
Results
We examined the performance of 2 monkeys in both the interactive and not interactive conditions. Both monkeys showed a very good performance in both conditions ( Fig. 1D) with an average correct performance, of 93% and 91% in the 2 conditions, respectively, for Monkey 1, and 95% and 91% for Monkey 2. In each condition, in both monkeys, the percentage of correct responses was above chance level (binomial test, P < 0.0001), showing that the monkeys were highly skillful in monitoring goals, not only based on their own choice but also on those of their human partner. A similar performance in not interactive and interactive conditions was reported in our previous behavioral experiment (Falcone, Brunamonti, Ferraina et al. 2012) . Supplementary Figure 1 shows that the performance of both monkeys did not change between the first 5 and the last 5 sessions remaining stable during the experiment.
Reaction times for not interactive and interactive conditions (Fig. 1E ) did not differ significantly in Monkey 2 (P = 0.106, t-test) and Monkey 1 (P = 0.247; t-test). We checked for a potential directional bias in the monkeys' responses that could be related to the position of the human agent on the monkey's right side, but we did not find any difference in the number of responses to left and right targets in both Monkey 2 (P = 0.351, t-test) and 1 (P = 0.551, t-test).
We examined the eye behavior in both monkey and human trials. Supplementary Figure 2 shows similar oculomotor behavior for both monkeys with the exception of the delay period. Monkey 2 at the end of delay period looked at the horizontal bar waiting for the go signal in both human and monkey trials, while in Monkey 1, we observed a higher proportion of trials in which the monkey looked at the object goal rather than the go signal or at the other object in both human and monkey trials. In both human and monkey trials, both monkeys looked at the object goal at the end of the hand movement and continued to look at it at least for the initial holding time.
We recorded 258 cells while both monkeys worked alongside with their human partner: 114 from Monkey 1 and 144 from Monkey 2. From the initial population of cells, we considered a subpopulation of 184 cells (81 from Monkey 1 and 103 from Monkey 2), with activity that was recorded for at least 20 correct trials for each agent. A 2-way ANOVA identified cells encoding the agent who performed the trial (either the monkey itself or the human agent) and the goal position (either right or left).
We analyzed the neuronal activity during 5 periods (see methods), a CS period at trial start, a delay period, a reaction and movement (RM) period, a holding-goal period, and a feedback period (Fig. 1A) . Figure 2A shows the percentage of cells with significant effects by ANOVA in each period with the exception of CS. The CS period could not be analyzed for future goal selectivity, because the future goal location could not be determined yet. The percentage of cells with a significant agent effect varied from 20% (36/184) in the feedback period to 32% (59/184) in the holdinggoal period. The number of cells modulated by the goal position varied from 15% (27/184) in the delay period to 34% (63/184) in the holding-goal period.
Supplementary Figure 3A shows the same results divided by monkey. Supplementary Figure 4 shows the results of an analogous 2-way ANOVA with agent and object goal (instead of goal position) as factors. Because of the very weak effect of the object goal, we will not analyze the object goal effect further.
A post hoc analysis (Fisher's LSD, P < 0.05) showed significant cell-agent specificity for goal position. Based on this analysis, we classified the cells in 3 groups: the "monkey-only" group included the cells that encoded the goal position in monkey's trials; the "human-only" group included the cells with a goal position effect specific to human trials; and the "both-agents" group consisted of cells with a goal position effect common to both agents. Figure 2B shows the percentage of significant cells divided by task period for the 3 groups of cells. In the delay period, we observed a prevalence of monkey-only neurons (68%). The percentage of human-only (23%) was higher than the percentage of both-agent cells (10%). In the other periods, we found a similar prevalence of monkey-only neurons, except for the holding-goal period in which the percentage of cells of the human-only cells exceeded the percentage of monkey-only cells. Supplementary Figure 3B shows the same results divided by monkey. Figure 3A shows the cells encoding significantly for agent in each epoch identified in Figure 2A . It appears that cells could be agent related specifically in 1 period and that cells that were agent related in >1 period tended to show the preference for the same agent. Figure 3B plots the cells encoding for spatial goals identified in Figure 2A in each epoch. As for the agent coding, the majority of cells encoding the goal position in >1 task period tended to show the same goal preference. Figure 4A shows a neuron with an agent effect having higher activity for correct trials performed by the monkey than for trials performed by the human agent during the first part of the feedback period. Figure 4B shows a different type of neuron, one with higher activity during trials performed by the human agent in the delay period. Figure 5A and B shows an example cell from the both-agents group with a preference during the holding-goal period for the right goal position in both monkey and human trials. Figure 5C and D shows an example cell from the human-only group. This cell showed a preference in the delay period for the left goal position in the human trials but no preference between goal positions in the monkey trials.
We performed a 2-way ANOVA with factors previous agent and previous goal position to test whether the neurons represented the agent and the goal chosen 1 trial back. We found that 9% of the cells (17/184) were modulated by the previous agent and 14% (25/184) by the previous goal position. As for the current-trial analyses, the post-hoc analysis (Fisher's LSD, P < 0.05) showed that 32 cells were significantly modulated by goal position for at least 1 agent. Forty-seven percent (15/32) of these neurons were specific to the monkey trials, 41% (13/32) to the human trials, and only 13% (4/32) to both. Figure 5E and F shows an example cell from the monkey-only group, selective for the previous goal position in the CS period. The cell showed a preference for the previous left goal position in the monkey trials without discriminating previous right from left goal positions in the human trials.
We also calculated the receiving operating characteristic (ROC) values to further characterize the selectivity for the goal Figure 6 shows the results of the ROC analysis for the goal position, for both monkeys, when the task was performed by the monkey and by the human agent. There was no significant difference between goal position ROC values in any task period, with the exception of the RM period with greater ROC values for monkey trials (Kruskall-Wallis test, P = 0.000001).
Discussion
We investigated the role of the lPFC in monitoring other agents' goals when a monkey and a human partner switched between actor and observer. We identified neurons that encoded the self-other distinction and represented the goals and actions of other agents. Our task design, in contrast to a much simpler 2 targets alternation task, separated previous from future goals by presenting multiple potential goals, so that the monkeys had to maintain in memory the previously chosen object goal to be able to switch to a different one on the next trial. In this way, the monkeys could not predict the object goal of the next trial or the current goal in the initial CS period. The monkeys could not also predict the goal position of the next trial in addition to the object goal, because its position was pseudorandomly selected in each trial. Adopting a human-monkey paradigm instead of a monkey-monkey paradigm offered the advantage of avoiding ambiguities in the prediction of the other agent future behavior, because the human choices were under experimental control. For example, the human agent was always performing correctly, while another monkey as agent could have aborted trials and made errors outside our experimental control. With our paradigm, we could maintain a stable predictive context and a stable reward expectation in the human trials.
Not only we found neurons encoding the previous goal position after self-decision, in confirmation of previous reports (Genovesio et al. 2006; Tsujimoto et al. 2012; Genovesio and Ferraina 2014; Genovesio, Tsujimoto et al. 2014 ), but we also identified neurons monitoring specifically the human agent's previous goal position. Although tracking the past goal position was irrelevant to the task, it is known that cells in this area encode information irrelevant to task performance probably with a monitoring function (Lauwereyns et al. 2001; Genovesio, Tsujimoto et al. 2014; Donahue and Lee 2015; Genovesio et al. 2015) . We identified neurons that encoded the previous goal position specifically for the human agent and others independently of the agent that performed the past trial. The neurons encoding specifically the previous goal position of the human partner could play a role in monitoring the other agent past choices, while the neurons representing the past choices independently of the agent who performed the previous trial could have had a more abstract monitoring role of the location of the previous goal. The neurons encoding only the monkeys' previous goal position are also interesting for their monitoring function of the monkey's own previous choices.
Other neurons were modulated by who performed the current trial in a specific task period. Among their potential functions, the agent-related neurons could be useful for coordinating actions within others in a social group. In primate social life, all this basic cognitive knowledge represents something at the foundation of social interaction. To know "who did what" is essential to predict the future behavior of other agents, often in terms of their rank position and potential role as allies or competitors. Because macaques have been found able to monitor (Falcone, Brunamonti, Ferraina et al. 2012 ) and learn both from other monkeys (Meunier et al. 2007 ) and from humans Bevacqua et al. 2013; Monfardini et al. 2014) , we can speculate that they can in addition to monitor also predict the humans' behavior. However, although with our paradigm, we could test behaviorally whether the monkeys monitored the partner choice we could not test behaviorally the monkeys' ability to predict others' choices, sharing the same limitation of other past studies (Fogassi et al. 2005; Maranesi et al. 2014 ). However, the presence of a delay period allowed us to test the presence of predicting neural signals in lPFC. We found cells encoding the future human agent's goal position in the delay period of the human trials, before any goal-directed action was performed. Two interpretations of these cells are possible: 1) they could represent a mental simulation or a rehearsal process in the human trials (both-agents neurons) or 2) they could represent a predictive activity for the next human choice (only humans neurons).
In our task, the monkeys could have generated a mental simulation of what they would have chosen as goal, as proposed by Cisek and Kalaska (2004) for the premotor cortex. They identified neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex that discharged both when the monkeys used a cursor to reach a goal on a screen and when they observed the movement of the cursor generated by the experimenter reaching the goal. These neurons responding to the cursor did not need the visual presentation of the arm (or the agent). Similarly, in an experiment by Tkach et al. (2007) , a computer-generated cursor movement that replayed the monkey's own movement activated the neurons as the cursor movement produced by the monkey, in both the primary motor and dorsal premotor cortex. A different form of mental simulation has been also shown for fictive (which the monkeys did not experience) reward in the anterior cingulate sulcus (Hayden et al. 2009 ).
We did observe neurons, which we called both-agents cells that represented the same spatial goal, independent of who was going to act. These cells showed a shared goal representation but other neurons did not, those encoding specifically the other agent's goal, which we called human-only cells. Only the latter represented a predictive neural signal of the other agent's future goal choice.
While we found a relatively high proportion of spatial selective cells, we found only a minority of neurons encoding the future object goal in contrast to other previous studies that emphasized the importance of prefrontal neurons for holding target object information prospectively in memory (Rainer et al. 1999; Kusunoki et al. 2009; Genovesio et al. 2012) . In the experiment of Genovesio et al. (2009 Genovesio et al. ( , 2012 , monkeys discriminated the relative duration of 2 stimuli of different shape and color presented in sequence at screen center. In that task, the spatial position of the object goal could be determined only after the appearance of the same 2 stimuli on the 2 sides of the screen and until that moment the object goal information could not be converted in a spatial goal. Similarly in the delayed paired association task used by Rainer et al. (1999) , a prospective target object representation based on the cue identity provided at the beginning of the trial needed to be maintained until the presentation of the test object. In another experiment of Kusunoki et al. (2009) , the target object needed to be maintained in a fixed target task or in cue-target association task until the target was presented. In our experiment, in contrast to the experiments described before, the object goal could be converted immediately in the spatial goal with no need to be stored in memory for a delay period, and this aspect of the task could account for the absence of future object goal selectivity in our study.
Our results extend to lPFC a role in social cognition, which has already been recognized for other frontal areas (Rudebeck et al. 2006; Yoshida et al. 2011; Azzi et al. 2012) . A role of prefrontal cortex in social cognition in monkeys had been only recently suggested in the study by Monfardini et al. (2015) that showed a relationship between social facilitation and increase of prefrontal activity. Neurons encoding agent identity have also been described in medial frontal cortex in relation to others' action (Yoshida et al. 2011 ) and by Azzi et al. (2012) in orbitofrontal cortex in the context of reward delivery to others, while other studies have shown that the amygdala plays a role in reading facial emotions (Hadj-Bouziane et al. 2012) . Yoshida et al. (2011) examined the action encoding during the execution or observation of the arm movement of another monkey in an interactive task. They found both agent and action-agent specific cells. Similarly to our study, the agent-related modulation in their study could not be associated to a specific agent. It is possible that an activation pattern like that reflects the representation of any other agent performing the task abstractly even to the point that could include a computer program instead of a social agent. Alternatively, agent-related signals could represent specifically the identity of the interacting agent.
In the experiment of Azzi et al. (2012) , monkeys were trained to discriminate cues that signaled rewards to self only or reward to both self and another monkey. Orbitofrontal neurons in that study were found sensitive to the other monkey's identity and social rank. In addition to the frontal cortex, a recent study showed a representation of the social context independent of the reward information also in the medial striatum (Klein and Platt 2013) . Interestingly, this information was represented separately by the information on fluid reward.
By introducing a delay period in our task, we could separate goal prediction signals from action and go beyond action observation. While Yoshida et al. (2011) could not examine whether the neural representation of other agent's actions was predictive, because the task lacked a delay period, Haroush and Williams (2015) in a recent study by introducing a delay period identified others-predictive neurons encoding the future partner's cooperative or noncooperative choice but not the monkey's own future choice. Neurons representing the future goal of an active, cooperative agent can contribute to self-other differentiation for both foraging and social activities, thus providing an ecological advantage that mirror neurons cannot provide. However, our study as the study by Haroush and Williams (2015) could not assess whether the prefrontal neurons were differentiating self from others or self from a specific agent that interacted with the monkey. To address this question, the monkeys should perform a task in which they interact with multiple agents as in the experiment of Azzi et al. (2012) .
We also found neurons encoding the agent or the goal position in the holding and feedback periods. The holding period was the only one in which we found more goal position coding neurons in the human trials than in the monkey trials. One possible interpretation of this result is that this activity reflected a confirmation of the monkey's prediction of the other agent choice that was not required during the monkeys' own actions. In addition to a monitoring function, it is possible that some of the feedback neurons specifically active in the human trials Figure 6 . Results of the ROC analysis for the future goal position in the different task periods plotted separately for monkey and human trials. In the CS (central stimulus) period, the ROC refers to the previous and not to the current goal. could be modulated by the outcome of the human choice in the feedback period. While striatal neurons (Báez-Mendoza et al. 2013 ) and orbitofrontal neurons (Chang et al. 2013 ) have been found coding primarily own reward, anterior cingulate neurons have been found to have the ability to differentiate between own and other's rewards (Chang et al. 2013) . Similarly Yoshida et al. (2012) have found neurons in the medial frontal cortex including the pre-supplementary motor area that signaled the errors of others.
Neurons in lPFC show also reward-related activity, some independently from the reward delivery in the form of task cue or feedback for succesful actions, and others limited to the case of the reward as feedback .
Previous outcome signals can also amplify the response signals in a stimulus-response mapping learning task (Histed et al. 2009 ) probably favoring learning. These and other studies suggest that the lPFC could, similarly to what we observed about goal coding, operate a distinction between self and others' reward, both for monitoring and for learning from others. Future studies should address these questions.
In conclusion, we found that lPFC represented a neural substrate not only for one's own spatial goal representations but also for those of other agents. With the varying-agent task used here, we were able to show the involvement of this area in the social-interactive aspects of action coordination and in particular in the monitoring of other agent choices. Future studies are essential to examine further the nature of the agent-related signals in lPFC introducing multiple agents and a moving cursor as the computer-interactive agent. Introducing a computer as an agent could help to understand whether or to which degree the agent and the predicting activities are specific to the social context involving other primates (humans). A previous study has shown a reduced agent-related activity when passing from a conspecific to a computer agent in the striatum (Báez-Mendoza et al. 2013 ), suggesting that the animacy of the interactive agent can play a role in modulating social-related activities. New experimental paradigms should also be conceived to test behaviorally the monkeys' predictive abilities in addition to their monitoring abilities as in our task.
